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COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW CONTINUITY
OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE REGULATION
John J. O'Donnell*
In December, 1979, the U.S. Treasury issued a proposed regulation'
setting forth continuity of business enterprise as an additional requirement
for an income-tax-free acquisitive reorganization. This proposed regula-
tion generated considerable comment and controversy within the tax bar.2
Criticism arose on two grounds: first, that the requirement of continuity of
business enterprise was invalid under existing statutes and case law; and
second, that the regulation was unnecessarily vague and incomplete,
making compliance with the requirement very difficult. One year later,
the Treasury issued the regulation in final form 3 substantially unchanged
from the proposed regulation, along with Treasury Decision (T.D.)
7745,4 a seven-page rebuttal of the criticisms made by the tax bar. Thus
the battle lines have been drawn, and the validity of requiring enterprise
continuity in reorganizations is to be determined in the courts. For the
many taxpayers choosing not to litigate such validity, the manner of
compliance now becomes the more compelling question. Can the vague
and incomplete regulation be complied with and, if so, can compliance be
relatively painless?
Enterprise continuity requirements have existed in various forms
throughout the field of corporate taxation for quite some time. The most
prominent of these was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1957 in Libson
Shops, Inc. v. Koehler.5 In applying the carryover provisions of the 1939
code, 6 the Court refused to allow a corporation, formed by the merger of
sixteen separate corporations, to carry over and deduct the pre-merger
losses of three of the constituent corporations. 7 The Court denied the de-
* Associate, Karr, Tuttle, Koch, Campbell, Mawer & Morrow, P.S., Seattle, Washington.
B.B.A., 1968, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1971, New York University; L.L.M. in Taxation,
1979, Boston University.
1. 44Fed. Reg. 76,813 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Aidinoff & Lopata, The Continuity of Business Enterprise Requirement and Invest-
ment Company Reorganizations, 58 TAxEs 914 (1980); Bloom, The Resurrection of a Dormant Doc-
trine: Continuity of Business Enterprise, 7 J. CORP. TAX. 315 (1981); Faber, Continuity of Interest
and Business Enterprise: Is it Time to Bury Some Sacred Cows?, 34 TAX LAW. 239 (1981); Libin,
Continuity of Business Enterprise: The New Regulations, 39 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. § 4.01
(1981).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (1980).
4. 1981-8I.R.B. 9.
5. 353 U.S. 382(1957).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 23(s), 122, as amended by Rev. Act of 1939, ch. 247, §§ 211,
122, 53 Stat. 867-68.
7. 353 U.S. at 388-90.
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duction of pre-merger losses against post-merger profits "not produced
by substantially the same businesses which incurred the losses." 8
In 1954, Congress expressly legislated the enterprise continuity con-
cept into the current Internal Revenue Code in two important tax areas:
tax-attribute carryovers and divisive reorganizations. The carryover of tax
attributes where corporate ownership changes by a purchase transaction is
now permitted only if the corporation continues to carry on a trade or
business substantially the same as that conducted prior to the purchase. 9
In divisive corporate reorganizations, tax-free status depends upon each
surviving corporation continuing to conduct a trade or business that the
previously unified corporation had been conducting for the five-year pe-
riod preceding the reorganization. 10
Many questions unanswered by the new regulation have already been
dealt with in these older forms of continuity of enterprise requirements.
This article will discuss the major unanswered questions of the new regu-
lation, examine how the older forms of continuity of enterprise have dealt
with such issues, and consider the propriety of applying the older-form
decisions to the new reorganization-enterprise continuity regulation. The
result will be some guidance, although unfortunately no guaranteed meth-
ods, on how to avoid being forced to litigate the validity of the regulation
itself.
I. FORMS OF TAX-FREE REORGANIZATIONS
Internal Revenue Code section 368 defines the transactions eligible for
treatment as tax-free reorganizations. An "A" reorganization is the com-
bination of two existing corporations either by merger or by consolidation
under local state corporation law." In a "B" reorganization, target cor-
poration shareholders transfer their controlling stock interest to the ac-
quiring corporation in exchange for some or all of the voting stock of the
acquiring corporation. 12 In a "C" reorganization, the acquiring corpora-
tion obtains substantially all of the assets of the target corporation by
transferring some or all of its voting stock to the target corporation or
target corporation shareholders. ' 3 "A," "B," and "C" reorganizations
all involve takeovers of target corporations and hence are often called
acquisitive reorganizations.
8. Id. at 390.
9. I.R.C. § 382(a)(1)(C).
10. Id. § 355(b)(1).
1I. Id. § 368(a)(1)(A).
12. Id. § 368(a)(1)(B).
13. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
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In a "D" reorganization, a corporation transfers some or all of its assets
to another corporation controlled by some or all of the shareholders of the
transferor corporation. 14 If the transferor corporation transfers only some
of its assets, then two corporations survive the transaction and a divisive
"D" reorganization results. If the transferor corporation transfers all of its
assets, then only one corporation survives, producing a non-divisive "D"
reorganization.
Three types of reorganizations are neither acquisitive nor divisive be-
cause they involve only one corporation. An "E" reorganization is a re-
capitalization that involves reordering the rights of common and preferred
shareholders and bondholders in a single corporation. 15 An "F" reor-
ganization is a mere change in form of a single corporation involving little
or no transfer of actual assets, such as a mere change in its state of incor-
poration. 16 A "G" reorganization is the reorganization of a single corpo-
ration in bankruptcy. 17
II. CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
ENTERPRISE CONTINUITY
Failure to achieve the requisite enterprise continuity produces a
reorganization taxable as an exchange of property, 18 usually with catas-
trophic results. Although the details of such taxation vary with the form
of attempted reorganization, certain taxation patterns are relatively clear.
Shareholders in the transferor corporation will be treated as making a tax-
able exchange of their stock for stock of the acquiring corporation. In
reorganizations involving the actual transfer of assets, such as types "C"
and "D" reorganizations,' 9 and in mergers viewed as asset sales, the
transferor corporation itself will be taxed on the exchange of its appreci-
ated assets for shares of the acquiring corporation unless the transferor
liquidates as part of the reorganization plan.20 In stock-exchange reorgan-
izations, such as type "B,''21 and in mergers viewed as exchanges of
14. Id. § 368(a)(1)(D).
15. Id. § 368(a)(l)(E).
16. Id. § 368(a)(1)(F).
17. Id. § 368(a)(1)(G).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
19. See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
20. Such liquidation will qualify under I.R.C. § 337, which provides that under those circum-
stances the corporation is exempt from all but recapture-type taxes on sales and exchanges of assets.
21. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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stock, the transferor corporation itself engages in no taxable activity. 22
The acquiring corporation that receives property in exchange for its own
stock also engages in no taxable activity. 23
Not all taxpayers, however, will resist having their transactions taxed
as exchanges rather than reorganizations. Taxpayers are often tempted to
liquidate a corporation, retain the liquid assets received, and transfer the
operating assets to another corporation. Taxing the retention of liquid as-
sets as an exchange for stock surrendered in liquidation is an attractive
method of distributing corporate earnings in a manner taxable at lower
capital gain rates. The government has successfully attacked these liqui-
dation-reincorporation schemes as types "D," 24 "E,, 2 5 and "F" 26 reor-
ganizations. Taxpayers might now be able to structure liquidation-rein-
corporations in a manner that fails to satisfy the new enterprise continuity
regulation, thereby precluding classification as "D," "E," or "F" reor-
ganizations. This result would deprive the government of its main weap-
ons against such bail-out devices.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The concept of reorganization-enterprise continuity has existed since
the beginning of federal income taxation. Many early reorganization
cases mentioned the phenomenon, 27 although whether these early cases
actually established a definite enterprise continuity requirement is at the
heart of the validity question. 28 In any event, the Treasury has consis-
tently held that enterprise continuity, whatever it might be, is a prerequi-
site for a valid reorganization. The reorganization regulation 29 both be-
fore and since addition of the new continuity requirement for acquisitive
reorganizations has stated that a requisite to a tax-free reorganization is
continuity of the business enterprise under the modified corporate form;
22. Since the acquiring corporation will acquire at least 80% of the transferor, subsequent liqui-
dation of the transferor will, under I.R.C. § 332, be free of all but recapture-type taxes.
23. I.R.C. § 1032. Of course, the potential tax problems for the acquiring corporation become
murkier in subsidiary and triangular mergers where the acquirer uses stock of its parent rather than its
own stock to make the acquisition. For an extensive treatment of all the variations in taxation of
taxable reorganizations, see Rachofsky, The Reorganization That Fails: Tax Consequences of an
InvoluntarilY Taxable Reorganization 32 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX. 639 (1974).
24. E.g., James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
25. Rev. Rul.61-156,1961-2C.B.62.
26. E.g., Davant v. Commissioner. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
27. E.g., Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932). cert. de-
nied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); Graham v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 623.628 (1938).
28. Compare. e.g., Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 2. at 921-25 with T.D. 7745, 1981-8 C.B.
9, at 10-13.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
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and this or similar provisions have existed in the predecessors of that reg-
ulation. 30
The IRS sought to put flesh on this regulation in Revenue Ruling
56-330.31 There the IRS held that the required enterprise continuity was
lacking where the successor corporation in an otherwise qualifying reor-
ganization engaged in a new business enterprise entirely different from
that conducted by its predecessors. It was unable to sustain this position
in court. 32 The IRS officially changed its position in Revenue Ruling
63-2933 in which it recognized that, although the regulation required the
surviving corporation to engage in a business enterprise, the corporation
need not continue the activities conducted by its predecessors. Revenue
Ruling 63-29 specifically revoked Revenue Ruling 56-330 and for all
practical purposes laid to rest the continuity of business enterprise ques-
tion in reorganizations for many years.
The depth of dormancy of the enterprise continuity requirement was
demonstrated by two private rulings issued in 1978. 34 Both rulings con-
cerned an operating company that made a taxable sale of its assets for
cash and then, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, transferred the pro-
ceeds to a regulated investment company in exchange for voting stock of
the investment company, which it then distributed to its shareholders. In
each ruling, the transaction in question was held to be a nontaxable reor-
ganization rather than a taxable liquidation of the transferor corporation.
Consequently, the shareholders achieved a diversification of their per-
sonal investment portfolios without a capital gain tax. The Service soon
had second thoughts and suspended further rulings on these transac-
tions.35 Over a year later, in December of 1979, the IRS completely re-
versed its position taken in the private rulings and announced the birth of
the new regulation requiring continuity of enterprise in tax-free acquisi-
tive reorganizations. In Revenue Ruling 79-433,36 the IRS expressly sus-
pended both the application of Revenue Ruling 63-29 and the issuance of
further letter rulings in this area, pending finalization of the new regula-
tion. In Revenue Ruling 79-43437 it found that an attempted reorganiza-
tion under section 368(a)(1)(C) 38 with a regulated investment company
30. E.g., Treas. Reg. 86, § 112(g)-I (1935) (requiring continuity of the business enterprise
under the modified corporate form).
31. 1956-2C.B. 204.
32. Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363, 367 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
33. 1963-1 C.B.77.
34. I.R.S. Letter Rul. 7829092, [1978] 73 I.R.S. Letter Rul. Reports (CCH), Apr. 24, 1978;
I.R.S. Letter Rul. 7825045, [1978] 69 I.R.S. Letter Rul. Reports (CCH), Mar. 23, 1978.
35. Faber, supra note 2, at 279.
36. 1979-2C.B. 155.
37. Id.
38. See generally note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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did not qualify as a tax-free reorganization because the transaction was, in
substance, a purchase by the transferor of stock in the investment com-
pany followed by the taxable liquidation of the transferor. As previously
mentioned, a considerable amount of criticism soon followed the pro-
posed regulation, 39 and it was not until a year later that the final regula-
tion was promulgated.
IV. SUMMARY OF FINAL REGULATION
The new regulation is quite short, consisting of approximately one
page of text and one page of examples. 40 The general rule is that continu-
ity of business enterprise requires that the acquiring corporation (P) ei-
ther: (i) continue the acquired corporation's (T's) historic business; or (ii)
39. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
40. The full text of the new Treasury regulation, minus the examples. is as follows:
(d) Continuity of business enterprise-(1) Effective date. (i) This paragraph (d) applies to
acquisitions occurring after January 30, 1981.
(ii) For an asset acquisition, the date of acquisition is the date of transfer. To determine the
date of transfer, see § 1.381(b)- I (b).
(iii) For a stock acquisition, the date of acquisition is the date on which the exchange of stock
occurs. If all stock is not exchanged on the same date, the date of exchange is the date the
exchange of all stock under the plan of reorganization is complete.
(2) General rule. Continuity of business enterprise requires that the acquiring corporation (P)
either (i) continue the acquired corporation's (T's) historic business or (ii) use a significant por-
tion of T's historic business assets in a business. The application of this general rule to certain
transactions, such as mergers of holding companies, will depend on all facts and circumstances.
The policy underlying this general rule, which is to ensure that reorganizations are limited to
readjustments of continuing interests in property under modified corporate form, provides the
guidance necessary to make these facts and circumstances determinations.
(3) Business continuirY. (i) The continuity of business enterprise requirement is satisfied if P
continues T's historic business. The fact P is in the same line of business as T tends to establish
the requisite continuity, but is not alone sufficient.
(ii) If T has more than one line of business, continuity of business enterprise requires only that
P continue a significant line of business.
(iii) In general, a corporation's historic business is the business it has conducted most re-
cently. However, a corporation's historic business is not one the corporation enters into as part
of a plan of reorganization.
(iv) All facts and circumstances are considered in determining the time when the plan comes
into existence and in determining whether a line of business is "significant. "
(4) Asset continuity. (i) The continuity of business enterprise requirement is satisfied if P uses
a significant portion of T's historic business assets in a business.
ii) A corporation's historic business assets are the assets used in its historic business. Busi-
ness assets may include stock and securities and intangible operating assets such as good will.
patents. and trademarks, whether or not they have a tax basis.
(iii) In general, the determination of the portion of a corporation's assets considered "signifi-
cant" is based on the relative importance of the assets to operation of the business. However, all
other facts and circumstances, such as the net fair market value of those assets, will be consid-
ered.
(5) Examples. The following examples illustrate this paragraph (d).
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (1980).
Vol. 57:55, 1981
Continuity of Business Enterprise
use a significant portion of T's historic business assets in a business. 4'
Enterprise continuity is satisfied if P continues any one of T's significant
historic lines of business. T's historic business is that business which it
most recently conducted, although a business started as part of the overall
reorganization plan will not qualify. 42
Enterprise continuity can also be achieved if P uses a significant por-
tion of T's historic business assets in any business. A corporation's his-
toric business assets are, not surprisingly, the assets used in its historic
business. These may include stock and securities, intangible operating
assets such as goodwill, or patents and trademarks, whether or not they
have a tax basis. 43 Thus, P has a choice of method in achieving enterprise
continuity: it can continue T's historic business; or, alternatively, it can
use a significant portion of T's business assets in any business.
The regulation gives no further explicit rules for determining the many
specific questions that could arise, but rather offers a general statement of
policy.44 The policy underlining the general rule is to insure that reorgani-
zations are limited to readjustments of continuing interests in property
under modified corporate form. The regulation states that this policy
should provide the guidance necessary for application of the enterprise
continuity requirement.4 5
In lieu of explicit rules, the regulation provides five examples as further
guidance.4 6 An examination of these examples indicates that each one
raises more questions than it answers. A review of each example and its
unanswered questions will demonstrate where guidance from the older
forms of enterprise continuity can be helpful-and, sometimes, even en-
lightening.
V. LINES OF BUSINESS-EXAMPLE (1)
Example (1) of the new regulation reads as follows:
T conducts three lines of business: manufacture of synthetic resins, manu-
facture of chemicals for the textile industry, and distribution of chemicals.
The three lines of business are approximately equal in value. On July 1,
1981, T sells the synthetic resin and chemical distribution businesses to a
third party for cash and marketable securities. On December 31,1981, T
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(2) (1980). "P" and "T" are used here in the same sense as in the
regulation itself. See generally note 40 supra.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(3) (1980).
43. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(4).
44. Id. § 1.368-1(d)2).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(5).
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transfers all of its assets to P solely for P voting stock. P continues the
chemical manufacturing business without interruption. The continuity of
business enterprise requirement is met. Continuity of business enterprise re-
quires only that P continue one of T's three significant lines of business.47
The Treasury tells us that example (1) shows that continuity of business
enterprise requires that P continue only one of the significant lines of T's
business. 48 Consider, however, the number of additional questions that
this proposition raises. What is a significant line of business? How active
must a significant line of business be? What are the facts and circum-
stances to be considered in making these determinations? Instinctively,
the section 355 rules concerning spin-offs and divisive reorganizations 49
come to mind as an area of fruitful inquiry. We can also gain some guid-
ance here from the regulations under section 382.50
A. Distinguishing Lines of Business
1. The "Two Business Rule" and Vertical Divisions
Consider first the overall trends in identifying separate businesses
under section 355. Identifying separate businesses is necessary because of
two statutory requirements: first, at least two separate businesses must
exist after the spin-off or reorganization; 5' and second, each such busi-
ness must have a previous five-year history of ownership and conduct by
the transferor. 52 Initially, the Treasury concluded that the requirement of
separate existing businesses after the transaction meant that two separate
businesses must have existed before the transaction. 53 It was long thought
that a vertical division of a single business-that is, a split up of one fully
integrated business into smaller parts, each carrying on all stages or func-
tions of the original business-was not valid under section 355.54 Thus
the main question in section 355 cases was the pre-existence of at least
two separate businesses. The "two business rule" was laid to rest in the
case of Edmond P. Coady,55 in which the Tax Court allowed vertical di-
visions of a previously existing fully integrated single business.
47. Id. § 1.368- 1(d)(5),example(l).
48. T.D. 7745, 1981-8 1.R.B. 9, at 9.
49. See generally text accompanying note 10 supra.
50. See generally text accompanying note 9 supra.
51. I.R.C. § 355(b)(1).
52. Id. § 355(b)(2)(B).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.355- (a) (1955).
54. See id.
55. 33T.C. 771 (1960).
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Now we have the question, does example (1) mean that reorganization-
enterprise continuity can be satisfied by a vertical split of T's business
with the retention of only a portion thereof by P, or is there an implied
two-business rule? While not specifically stated therein, it appears that
the example (1) situation satisfies the new continuity of business enter-
prise requirement only if there are two pre-existing businesses.
The new regulation states that P need continue only one significant line
of business when T has more than one line of business, with no particular
concern for the lines of business conducted by the other distributees of
T.56 If P were to conduct less than all of T's previous single integrated
business, then P would, at least, run the risk of not conducting a line of
business that is "significant." Further, attempting to satisfy enterprise
continuity by vertical split offers too convenient a method of avoiding the
significant-portion aspect of the alternative continuity of business assets
requirement. P could dispose of most of the assets and business of T and,
while operating only a nominal or insignificant portion of T's business,
claim to fully satisfy the business continuity requirement by operating one
of the lines of business of T resulting from a vertical split of the single
pre-transfer business of T.
Such activities are also contrary to the regulations defining enterprise
continuity for purposes of the carryover of tax attributes under section
382. Those regulations provide that continuity of business enterprise is
broken if P discontinues more than a minor portion of the business carried
on prior to the transfer. 57 Thus, it appears that the old two-business rule
would apply to the example (1) situation. Consequently, we should look
for guidance under section 355 only from the old regulations and case
law, and should not consider the new proposed regulation58 and cases
decided after the abandonment of the two-business rule.
2. Geographical Location
Geographical location historically has also been a significant factor in
identifying separate lines of business under section 355 situations. The
examples under the section 355 regulations illustrate how separate loca-
tions constitute separate lines of business in a number of situations. 59
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(3)(ii) (1980).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1(h)(7) (1962).
58. 42 Fed. Reg. 3866 (1977) (proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1 to-3).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(d) (1955). Examples (8), (9), (13) and (14) all indicate that locations
in separate states of the same activities constitute separate businesses. Example (15) finds separate
businesses because the same manufacturing functions are performed in separate states, although all
sales work is performed for all locations at an office located in only one state. Example (10) finds
separate businesses in locations as close as a city and a related suburb, although the fact that each
Washington Law Review
Under these examples any common facilities, beyond a sales office, serv-
ing activities in more than one state would make highly suspect a finding
of more than one line of business solely on account of geographical loca-
tion. Thus, the only definite conclusion that we can draw for situations
other than those falling directly within the fact patterns of the examples is
that separate geographical location is a significant factor to be considered
in determining whether separate lines of business exist, but it by no
means is determinative.
3. Functional Divisions
Another significant but elusive factor to consider is a functional distinc-
tion between businesses based on the type of business activity conducted.
The current section 355 Regulations provide that an activity will not be
considered a separate business unless the activity includes every opera-
tion which forms a part or step in the process of earning income or profit,
including the collection of income and the payment of expenses. 60 Under
example (11) of those regulations, selling and manufacturing activities in
the meat products business are really two steps of an integrated busi-
ness. 61 Under example (12), a captive coal mine does not constitute a
business separate from the manufacturing and selling of steel because the
coal mine operation did not include the independent production of in-
come. 62
There is no indication whether this need for separate customers for sec-
tion 355 purposes is also a requirement for enterprise continuity in reorga-
nizations. Example (1) of the enterprise continuity regulations and the
case that inspired it, Lewis v. Commissioner,63 are both tantalizingly
vague on this point. The stated separate lines of business include the man-
ufacturing of chemicals for the textile industry and distribution of chemi-
cals. It is not clear whether the distribution business included the distribu-
tion of chemicals manufactured for textile industries or whether the
manufacturing business performed its own distribution functions. Conse-
quently, while the function or type of activity of each business seems to
be one of the most significant factors in determining whether or not sepa-
rate lines of business exist, we have no clear rules or indications of just
how such determinations should be made.
location has a separate manager directing operations and making purchases and that there is a lack of
common warehouse facilities also influences the finding of separate businesses.
60. Id. § 1.355-1(c).
61. Id. § 1.355-1(d),example(l1).
62. Id. § 1.355-l(d),example(12).
63. 176 F.2d 646 (lst Cir. 1949).
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B. Activity Requiredfor Separate Lines of Business
Section 355 requires that each separate business be an active busi-
ness. 64 This raises the question whether this requirement exists by anal-
ogy for reorganization-enterprise continuity purposes. The regulation
governing carryover of tax attributes is more lenient, providing that the
holding of property for investment purposes shall not be considered a
trade or business unless such activities historically constituted the primary
activities of the corporation. 65 T.D. 7745 adopts this more lenient view
for reorganization enterprise continuity requirements by stating that in-
vestment operations may constitute a historic business if the investment
assets were not acquired as part of a plan of reorganization. 66 This lack of
active business requirement means that all section 355 regulation exam-
ples dealing with real estate and making distinctions based on activity of
management and number of tenants67 should not limit the identification of
separate lines of business for continuity of enterprise purposes. Disposing
of all of T's operating assets other than real estate, however, does run the
risk of violating the alternative requirement of continuity of business as-
sets, while still not clearly satisfying the continuity of historic business
requirement. Thus, caution is certainly advisable here, although retaining
operating real estate might some day provide a convenient means of for-
mally satisfying continuity of business enterprise, or at least might offer
some straws to clutch at in a desparate situation.
Thus example (1) of the continuity of business enterprise regulations
appears to raise more questions than it answers. A review of the law
under sections 355 and 382 indicates that geographical location and type
of business activity are significant in determining the identity of separate
lines of business. Active as opposed to passive investment is not a neces-
sary characteristic of a separate line of business for reorganization-enter-
prise continuity. Most likely, vertically integrated segments of a previ-
ously unified business will not constitute separate lines of business for
purposes of reorganization-enterprise continuity. Whether an activity
need have its own separate customers in order to constitute a separate line
of business is not at all clear.
64. I.R.C. § 355(b)(1).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h)(4) (1962).
66. 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at 12.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(d), examples (3), (4), (6) and (7) (1955).
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VI. ASSET CONTINUITY-EXAMPLE (2)
Example (2) of the new enterprise continuity regulation provides as fol-
lows:
P manufactures computers and T manufactures components for comput-
ers. T sells all of its output to P. On January 1, 1981, P decides to buy
imported components only. On March 1, 1981, T merges into P. P contin-
ues buying imported components but retains T's equipment as a backup
source of supply. The use of the equipment as a backup source of supply
constitutes use of a significant portion of T's historic business assets, thus
establishing continuity of business enterprise. P is not required to continue
T's business. 68
According to T.D. 7745, example (2) shows that enterprise continuity
may exist even if P's use of T's assets differs from T's use of those as-
sets. 69 Once again, a number of additional questions arise. Which assets
constitute a significant portion of T's assets both as to quantity and qual-
ity? How active a "use" must P make of T's assets?
A. Quantity and Quality ofAssets
T.D. 7745 tells us that example (2) is based on the case of Atlas Tool
Co. v. Commissioner.70 There, T transferred its machinery and inventory
constituting 19% of its total assets to P, and transferred cash resulting
from accounts receivable collections and accumulated earnings constitut-
ing 81% of its total assets to its own shareholders. In concluding that the
transaction constituted a nondivisive "D" reorganization, 7 1 the court ap-
plied the tests under section 354(b)(1)(A), which requires that the acquir-
ing corporation acquire substantially all of the assets of the transferor cor-
poration. 72 Consequently it was the operational quality of the assets
transferred, rather than their quantity, that satisfied the "substantially
all" requirement.
If the tests under section 354(b)(1)(A) determine which assets are suffi-
cient to satisfy continuity of business enterprise requirements, then we
have narrowed the scope of the question without, however, gaining too
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (d)(5), example (2) (1980).
69. 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at 9.
70. 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
71. See generally note 14 and accompanying text supra.
72. 614 F.2d at 865.
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much additional certainty. Atlas Tool allowed 19% of the assets to consti-
tute "substantially all,'' 73 and the cases cited therein contain similar
disproportionate percentages. 74
For advance ruling purposes, the Internal Revenue Service takes the
opposite viewpoint, requiring that at least 90% of the fair market value of
the net assets and 70% of the fair market value of the gross assets held by
the corporation be transferred to P in order to satisfy this "substantially
all" requirement, with no distinction made between operating and other
assets. 75 Although the requirement sets forth a safe haven for advance
ruling purposes rather than the IRS view of the law, it makes it difficult to
transfer anything less than all of T's assets to P in order to satisfy the
"substantially all" requirements of a nondivisive "D" reorganization,
and arguably also to satisfy the reorganization-enterprise continuity re-
quirements where P has no intention of continuing any of T's lines of
business.
A recent Sixth Circuit case, Laure v. Commissioner,76 suggests, how-
ever, that a different mode of analysis may be appropriate under the enter-
prise continuity regulation. In that case the acquiring corporation (P) was
a manufacturer, while the transferor corporation () operated an air trans-
port service that P used for deliveries. The common owner of both corpo-
rations merged T into P to save T from financial difficulties. As part of the
overall plan, P sold all of T's principal operating assets, other than T's
land and hangar, to T's former chief pilot, who continued to operate the
service and leased the land and hangar from P.
The Tax Court, in an opinion77 decided prior to the promulgation of the
enterprise continuity regulation, 78 concluded that the merger failed to sat-
isfy enterprise continuity because P neither continued T's business nor
used any of T's assets. 79 P's mere holding of ownership in the land and
hangar was deemed an insufficient continuous participation in T's as-
sets. 80 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the Tax Court's finding of lack
of enterprise continuity clearly erroneous. 8' It stated that all that enter-
prise continuity requires is that P receive and continue to use some mini-
73. Id. at 865-66.
74. See also James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1965), where "substantially all" was held to
consist of 51% of the corporation's assets because they constituted 100% of its operating assets.
75. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, at 569.
76. 653 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1981).
77. Laurev. Commissioner, 70T.C. 1087 (1978).
78. The proposed regulations were issued over one year after the Tax Court's decision, on De-
cember 28, 1979. See note I supra.
79. 70T.C. at 1104.
80. Id. at 1105.
81. 653 F.2d at 262.
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mum amount of T's assets. 82 Twenty-seven and one-fourth percent of T's
assets was found substantial enough to constitute this minimum amount,
especially in light of the importance of such assets to P's ability to obtain
continued air transport service for its deliveries. 83
Of particular interest in this case is the Sixth Circuit's observation that,
although the effective date of the new enterprise continuity regulation
precluded application to the case at bar, the regulation supported the
court's decision. 84 It noted that the regulation determined a business as-
set's significance on the basis of the relative importance of the asset to the
operation of the business. The court found that, because of the extreme
importance of the land and hangar to P's business, these assets were sub-
stantial under the new regulation. 85
Determining significance of the quality and quantity of T's assets based
on their importance to P's business is a somewhat disturbing approach
remarkably different from the "substantially all" test of section
354(b)(1)(A). 86 Here, P's needs or desires for the assets, rather than T's
prior use of them, would be the paramount consideration. Both the opera-
tional quality of T's use and the percentage of T's total assets would be of
little or no importance. Determining significance based on P's showing of
the assets' importance to its own business would establish a subjective
test that would generate more uncertainty rather than more clarity in this
area. Moreover, requiring P to show compelling business importance for
its asset acquisition requires little, if anything, more than establishing a
business purpose for the transaction. Business purpose, however, is a
separate reorganization prerequisite of long standing. 87 Consequently,
carried to its logical extreme, the Sixth Circuit's approach reduces enter-
prise continuity from a separate reorganization prerequisite to a minor
subdivision of the business purpose requirement. 88
Thus, at least three alternative approaches exist for determining suffici-
ency of quality and quantity in asset continuity. The IRS's advance ruling
approach 89 offers the advantage of mathematical certainty, but the disad-
vantage of stringent requirements for actual compliance. The Sixth Cir-
cuit's approach 90 offers great ease in compliance, but the issues created
82. Id. at 261.
83. Id. at 261 & n.7.
84. Id. at 262n.9.
85. Id.
86. See generally note 72 and accompanying text supra.
87. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935). See also Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1 (c) (1955).
88. Some commentators have argued for just such a reduction. E.g., Faber, supra note 2.
89. See generallv note 75 and accompanying text supra.
90. See generally note 84 and accompanying text supra.
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by this approach make its validity suspect. The section 354(b)(1)(A) ap-
proach 9' offers the most safety, both because an established line of case
law offers at least some predictability of application 92 and because acqui-
sition of most, if not all, of T's operating assets will most likely also
provide a basis for satisfying the Sixth Circuit's approach as well.
B. Asset Uses
The regulation offers no indication of how much actual use of T's as-
sets P must make. Example (2) states that use of the equipment as a
backup source is sufficient. Backup source use, however, can mean al-
most anything, from having the assets fully operational and on line, to
mere asset storage. In Atlas Tool, P began to use the backup equipment
itself within approximately two months of acquisition, and within a year
of the transfer was using all of the backup equipment in active manufac-
turing activities in exactly the same manner that they had been used prior
to the transfer. This is a far cry from mere storage of assets.
What if P uses the assets in a manner that seeks to approximate the
economic effect of selling them, such as by borrowing heavily against the
assets, or leas.ing them under long term lease arrangements? In Pebble
Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner,93 the transferor corporation sold
or distributed its inventory and cash equivalents to third parties or stock-
holders, purportedly sold its whiskey-distilling business and plant to the
acquiring corporation, and then liquidated. The acquiring corporation
never operated the distillery and merely rented out the plant to a variety of
tenants. The court found that the transactions constituted a nondivisive
"D" reorganization, although the question of continuity of enterprise or
use of assets was never raised. Although the Sixth Circuit cited this case
in its Laure decision 94 as authority that the acquiring corporation need not
receive all of the transferor's assets in a reorganization, the Laure deci-
sion does not support the implication of Pebble Springs that any asset use,
however passive, is sufficient. For the Laure decision emphasized the op-
erational business importance to the acquiring corporation of its leasing
out of the assets it did acquire. 95 Consequently, while it appears that pas-
sive use or holding of the assets is not per se a violation of asset continu-
ity, prudence dictates that the acquiring corporation ought to develop
91. See generally note 72 and accompanying text supra.
92. These cases are cited in Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 865 n.5 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
93. 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956).
94. 653F.2dat261.
95. Id. at 262 n.9.
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some operational business reason for such passive use or holding of the
assets.
VII. HISTORIC BUSINESS-EXAMPLE (3)
Example (3) provides as follows:
T is a manufacturer of boys' and men's trousers. On January 1, 1978, as
part of a plan of reorganization, T sold all of its assets to a third party for
cash and purchased a highly diversified portfolio of stocks and bonds. As
part of the plan T operates an investment business until July 1. 1981. On
that date, the plan of reorganization culminates in a transfer by T of all of its
assets to P, a regulated investment company, solely in exchange for P vot-
ing stock. The continuity of business enterprise requirement is not met. T's
investment activity is not its historic business, and the stocks and bonds are
not T's historic business assets. 96
A. Overall Plan Requirement
The version of this example in the original proposal did not explicitly
identify T's investment activities as part of the overall reorganization
plan, 97 and for that reason was the most controversial of the proposed
examples. 98 Criticism arose because a three and a half year wait between
assets sale and reorganization 99 made the implication of one overall plan
unrealistic, and implied that any assets ever acquired by T with proceeds
from the sale of former operating assets could never qualify as the historic
business or assets of T.100 Other criticism viewed the example as imply-
ing that investing in stocks or securities could never constitute a historic
business. 101
The final regulations and T.D. 7745 attempt to resolve some of these
issues by specifically identifying T's investment business as part of the
overall plan. The Treasury Decision points out that investment operations
may constitute a historic business and that the existence of such a busi-
ness as part of an overall plan of reorganization is to be determined under
traditional step-transaction principles. A lapse of time between steps is
one factor in determining whether the steps are part of the overall plan,
although all other facts and circumstances would also be considered.
Consequently, the possibility exists that the mutual-fund reorganizations
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.368- 1(d)(5), example (3) (1980).
97. 44 Fed. Reg. 76,813, 76,815 (1979) (proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.368-I (d)(5), example (3)).
98. T.D. 7745, 1981-8 1.R.B. 9. at 14. See also sources cited in note 2supra.
99. T.D. 7745, 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at 14.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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that precipitated issuance of enterprise continuity regulations 102 can in
fact still take place. How the IRS will rule on such applications, and what
must be done to show that previous assets dispositions were not part of
the overall plan, remains to be seen.
A number of major questions still remain unanswered by example (3).
How long must a business have been held by the transferor to become a
historic business? What about reviving dormant businesses? What about
temporary shutdowns either before or after the transfer?
B. Investing as an Historic Business
The regulations and cases concerning enterprise continuity under sec-
tion 382 offer some guidance here. Section 382(a) limits the carryover of
tax attributes of corporations whose ownership has changed in a purchase
transaction to those corporations that continue to carry on a trade or busi-
ness substantially the same as that conducted prior to the purchase. 103 As
previously noted, 1°4 regulation section 1.382(a)-l(h)(4) requires that in-
vestment activities must have historically constituted the primary activi-
ties of the corporation in order to constitute a trade or business. This rule
was illustrated in the case of Exel Corp. v. United States. 105 There the
taxpayer had operated retail lumberyards for over fifty years prior to sell-
ing all of its assets for cash. The corporation invested the cash in short
term government securities and later on in common stock. About a year
and a half after converting all of its assets into securities, the ownership of
the taxpayer corporation changed sufficiently to invoke application of
section 382(a). 106 The court found that the new owners had failed to con-
tinue the historic business of the corporation because the historic business
of the corporation was not investment activities. The court rejected classi-
fication of the investment activities as the historic business because the
corporation had initially invested entirely in short term securities that
were converted completely into cash approximately a year after the sale
of the lumber assets, and because there was no mention in the minutes
about converting the corporation to the business of investing. 107
Thus we can conclude that, while investment activity of a corporation
can become its historic business, a year and a half of such activity is
certainly not long enough to attain that status. Apparently the Treasury
102. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
103. I.R.C. § 382(a)(1)(C).
104. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
105. 451 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1971).
106. Id. at 83.
107. Id. at 85-86.
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feels that even three and a half years might not be long enough, despite
the fact that the acquisition of the investment business was not part of the
overall plan of subsequent transfer by the corporation. 108 Just how long a
business must be held in order to become a historic business remains to be
seen, and it is not clear whether it takes longer to properly season an
investment business than a more active business.
C. Revival of Pre-Reorganization Dormant Business
Could the new owners of Exel Corporation avoid tax problems by re-
viving some retail lumberyard operations? Does a suspension of the con-
duct of the business permanently eliminate such business from being con-
sidered a historic business of T? This question is dealt with by a
regulation in the area of carryover of tax attributes. 0 9 The regulation
states that revival of a dormant business after change of ownership will
not constitute the requisite continuity of business enterprise if a corpora-
tion indefinitely ceased its business operations, although a revival of busi-
ness operations only temporarily suspended will suffice. The regulation's
examples indicate that suspension of operations on account of general ad-
verse business conditions constitutes the prohibited indefinite cessation,
whereas suspension of operations on account of a fire constitutes the per-
mitted temporary suspension. 110
Case law under section 382 has taken a more liberal approach, treating
business stoppages as allowable temporary suspensions whenever it ap-
pears that the corporation always intended to reactivate the business, de-
spite the reason for the stoppage. Thus, in H.F. Ramsey Co. v. Cominis-
sioner, 111 the corporation was required by its bonding company to wrap
up operations and sell its equipment in order to regain financial stability.
Since the corporation showed an intention to strengthen itself and no in-
tention to cease operations, the corporation was found only temporarily
inactive. Thus, a change of business ownership during this inactive pe-
riod followed by a revival of the business activity satisfied the continuity
of business enterprise requirement. So too, in Clarksdale Rubber Co. v.
Commissioner, 112 the corporation voluntarily ceased operations and
leased its assets to a sister corporation in order to regain financial stabil-
ity. There were no asset sales and there was no intention to close the
108. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. The Treasury never changed the dates in exam-
ple (3), nor expressed any view about the propriety of the time period. It merely stipulated that the
investment activity was part of the overall plan in the final version of example (3).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h)(6) (1962).
110. Id.
Ill. 43T.C.500(1965).
112. 45T.C.234(1965).
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business. Revival of the business by the new owners satisfied the continu-
ity of business requirement. The IRS has non-acquiesced in H.F. Ramsey
Co."13 Consequently, revitalization of a dormant historic business offers
some opportunity, but no guarantee of success, in satisfying the reorgani-
zation-enterprise continuity regulations.
Cases involving carryovers under section 382, however, have limited
applicability in reorganizations under section 368. For instance, in United
States v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 114 the court found that the corporation's
adoption of a plan of liquidation and dissolution indicated an intent to
close the business permanently, rather than engage in a temporary sus-
pension, so that continuity of business enterprise was considered broken.
Yet, in many reorganization plans, the parties contemplate the liquidation
of at least one of the participating corporations, and such liquidation is
not inconsistent with the concept of reorganization. 115 Thus, what might
in section 382 cases be indicative of permanent business cessation of an
ongoing corporation is not necessarily an indication of permanent cessa-
tion of the business of either party in a reorganization, even if the trans-
feror liquidates as part of the transaction.
VIII. POST REORGANIZATION DISPOSALS-EXAMPLE (5)
Following logic rather than numerical order, consider next example
(5), which provides as follows:
T manufactures farm machinery and P operates a lumber mill. T merges into
P. P disposes of T's assets immediately after the merger as part of the plan
of reorganization. P does not continue T's farm machinery manufacturing
business. Continuity of business enterprise is lacking. "16
Example (5) tells us that the sale of the business assets by P after the
reorganization has the same disqualifying effect as sale of the business
assets by T prior to the reorganization. The proposed version was more
controversial, because it condemned P's asset sale without explicitly
identifying it as part of the plan of reorganization. 117 T.D. 7745 states
that the final regulations clarify that only dispositions by P pursuant to a
plan are proscribed, so that P would not be prevented from other post-
acquisition changes in business or assets. 118
113. Cumulative List of Non-Acquiescences, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
114. 360 F.2d 260(10th Cir. 1966).
115. B. BrIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS 14-129 (1979).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5), example (5) (1980).
117. 44Fed. Reg. 76,813, 76,815 (1979) (proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.368- 1(d)(5), example (5)).
118. 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at 14.
Washington Law Review
Once again, unanswered questions arise. What kind of changes and
disposals can P make in T's business? How long must P hold T's business
or assets before P can safely dispose of them? Is different treatment justi-
fied if P's disposal is in a tax-free transaction, such as another reorganiza-
tion or a section 332 liquidation?
A. Factors Constituting a Prohibited Change in Business
1. In General
The regulations and cases dealing with the carryover of tax attributes
under section 382 again prove quite informative here. That section uses a
test based on facts and circumstances to determine whether the business
after the transaction was substantially the same as before the transaction.
Among the relevant factors to be taken into account are changes in the
corporation's employees, plant, equipment, production, location, cus-
tomers, or other items that are significant in determining whether there is
or is not a continuity of the same business enterprise. 119 Discontinuance
of more than a minor portion of business carried on prior to the transac-
tion breaks the continuity of business enterprise. Factors to be considered
in determining what constitutes only a minor portion of business include
the amount of capital investment, gross income, size of payroll, and simi-
lar factors. 120 Unfortunately, the examples under the section 382 regula-
tions are not too helpful when applied to reorganization-enterprise conti-
nuity analysis. The enterprise continuity requirement under section 382 is
not satisfied by continuance of merely any line of business, but rather
requires that the particular pre-transaction line of business that produced
the losses be continued after the transaction. 121
2. Change in Location and Personnel
Changes in geographic location are subject to close scrutiny under the
section 382 regulations. Changes in the location of the major portion of a
corporation's activities breaks its continuity of enterprise when the result
is substantial alteration of the business of the corporation. 122 The exam-
ples under this regulation tell us much not only about changes in location
but also about the relative importance of other facts. In the first example,
continuity of business was broken when a manufacturing enterprise
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)- 1(h)(5) (1962).
120. Id. § 1.382(a)-I(h)(7).
121. Compare id., example (1) with id., example (2).
122. Id. § 1.382(a)-I(h) (9).
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moved to a new state, disposed of its old assets and a majority of its old
employees,1 23 but maintained its same products and the same group of
customers. In the second example, continuity of business enterprise was
maintained when a store moved from the downtown area to a suburban
location, retaining most of its former employees, product lines, and cus-
tomers, but disposing of most of its assets. 124 In the third example, conti-
nuity of business was broken where a liquor store moved from one town
to another and changed half of its employees and most of its customers,
although it retained most of its assets. 125 From these examples we can
conclude that, at least in the section 382 area, employees are the most
significant, and identity of assets is the least significant, factor in deter-
mining business change. Continuity of a business's product lines or cus-
tomers seems to fall somewhere in between.
The section 382 regulations contain an unusual rule concerning corpo-
rations that primarily engage'in the rendering of services. If the particular
individuals rendering services prior to the sale transaction do not continue
on after the transaction, then business continuity is broken.126 Applica-
tion of this rule to the reorganization area could cause considerable diffi-
culty, for example where public corporations merge with local insurance
agencies.
Case law has been more tolerant of employee changes than have been
the regulations. In Commissioner v. Goodwyn Crockery Co., 12 7 a hard
goods dealer added a dry goods business, moved the business from Ten-
nessee to Illinois, lost half of its customers, opened retail stores, and
changed all but one employee. The court noted that additions to the busi-
ness have no effect on the continuity requirement so long as the old busi-
ness also continues. Changes of location were not viewed as constituting
a change of business where the new location remained within the original
territory of the business. The court did not reach the question of the valid-
ity of the section 382 regulations because the challenged move occurred
before issuance of the regulations. 128
Both the relocation cases and the regulations emphasize that the deter-
mination of whether there has been a change of business is a question to
be decided by the particular facts and circumstances of a given case. Thus
all that the cases really tell us is that the emphasis on identity of employ-
123. Id., example (1).
124. Id., example (2).
125. Id., example (3).
126. Id. § 1.382(a)-l(h) (10).
127. 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963).
128. For a similar liberal allowance of changes in location, see The Wallace Corp., 1964 T.C.M.
(P-H) V 64,010.
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ees might be misplaced. We still lack definite guidelines within the reor-
ganization area, although the authorities under section 382 do indicate
which facts and circumstances are in general more significant.
B. Holding Period ofAcquired Business
In order to maintain enterprise continuity under section 382, the acquir-
ing entity must effectively meet a two-year holding period requirement.
This requirement results from an intelligent reading of section
382(a)(1)(A), (B), and (C). 129 This relatively short holding period could
explain some of the harsher prohibitions against business changes in the
section 382 regulations, 130 particularly the rule concerning service corpo-
rations. 1 31 There does not appear to be any other authority on how long P
must continue to hold the business or assets of T, other than the general
considerations of step-transaction doctrines 32 and the prudence of letting
previous transactions grow old and cold before further tampering with
results. One hopes the IRS will provide some sort of safe-haven holding,
as it has done with shareholder stock and securities in the continuity of
interest area. 133
C. Subsequent Tax-Free Transfers ofAcquired Business
There also does not appear to be any authority dealing directly with the
effect on enterprise continuity of a tax-free subsequent transfer by P of
T's historic business or assets. The situation, however, is closely analo-
gous to subsequent tax-free transactions by surviving entities in spin-offs
under section 355.134 The leading case in that area is Commissioner v.
Morris Trust. ' 35 There the distributor corporation spun-off an unwanted
business and then merged with a third corporation as part of an overall
plan, in which the third corporation was the surviving corporation of the
merger. The court ruled that the continuation of an active trade or busi-
ness by the distributor after the spin-off was satisfied despite the merger,
129. B. BITrKER &J. EUSTICE, supra note 115, at 16-58 n.138.
130. For example, that suspension of operations on account of general adverse business condi-
tions constitutes a prohibited cessation. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)- I (h) (6), example (I).
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-I (h) (10) (1962). See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
132. The term "'step transaction" refers to situations where two or more transactions indepen-
dent in form are deemed to be so dependent in substance that the tax consequences are measured not
by each separate step, but rather by combining all steps into one overall transaction. See J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 20.161-. 166 (1972).
133. Rev. Proc. 77-37. 1977-2 C.B. 568.
134. Such transactions must meet the statutory enterprise continuity requirements. See notes 5 1
& 52 and accompanying text supra.
135. 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
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because all of the parties intended that the distributor's business be con-
tinued indefinitely, and the merger in no way caused a discontinuance of
the distributor's business. 136 The stockholders of the distributor had
maintained a continuing interest in the distributor's business through
stock ownership in the surviving third corporation. The court noted that if
the distributor had been the survivor of the merger, then the government
could not have raised the argument that the merger constituted a failure of
the distributor to continue its own active trade or business after the spin-
off. 137 The court stated that it would not change the tax result on the basis
of a technicality as insubstantial as which of the two corporations actually
survived the merger. 138 The IRS has agreed to follow this case. 139
The policy of the new regulations is to insure that reorganizations are
limited to readjustments of continuing interests in property under modi-
fied corporation forms. 140 The Morris Trust case indicates that if the ac-
quiring corporation disposes of an acquired historic business in a subse-
quent tax-free reorganization, even if done as part of the original plan of
the combined transactions, then this policy is not violated. Consequently,
it would appear that reorganization-enterprise continuity is not lost by the
subsequent transfer of historic business or assets by the acquiror in an-
other tax-free reorganization.
IX. PRE-REORGANIZATION DISPOSALS-EXAMPLE (4)
Finally, let us turn to example (4), which provides as follows:
T manufactures children's toys and P distributes steel and allied products.
On January 1, 1981, T sells all of its assets to a third party for $100,000
cash and $900,000 in notes. On March 1, 1981, T merges into P. Continuity
of business enterprise is lacking. The use of the sales proceeds in P's busi-
ness is not sufficient.'41
Example (4) is the most mysterious of the five examples in the regulation,
and it is not entirely clear why the Treasury included it here. The example
demonstrates that continuity of enterprise cannot be based upon T's con-
version of business assets to liquid assets prior to the reorganization, but
we have already learned this lesson in example (3). Example (5) tells us
that P cannot dispose of the assets immediately after the reorganization.
136. Id. at 799.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-2 C.B. 148.
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (5), example (4) (1980).
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Thus, anyone even at least faintly familiar with the step-transaction doc-
trine 142 could readily have predicted the outcome of example (4).
The Treasury Department offers an explanation that further muddies
the waters. 143 It states that example (4) is a variation on the facts of Reve-
nue Ruling 63-29,144 and the example reaches a result different from the
revenue ruling. 145 It further states that the transaction is not a mere pur-
chase by T of P's stock, because T received third-party notes which are
not cash equivalent. This does little to clarify the reason for the inclusion
of this seemingly redundant example.
A. Identity of Survivor
A review of revenue rulings prior to and since the issuance of the final
regulation, however, gives some understanding of what the Treasury De-
partment is trying to say in example (4). As previously mentioned, 146
Revenue Ruling 79-434 found a similar transaction to constitute a pur-
chase of stock followed by a liquidation. The only factual difference be-
tween Revenue Ruling 79-434 and example (4) is that in Revenue Ruling
79-434 the acquisition of stock was solely for cash and treasury notes,
whereas in example (4) T acquires P's stock in exchange for both cash
and third-party notes. This is the distinction that the Treasury Department
refers to in its comments about cash equivalence. 147 Apparently, the situ-
ation dealt with in Revenue Ruling 79-434 does not even rise to the dig-
nity of analysis as a potential reorganization because it so obviously con-
stitutes a sale. Thus, one might suspect that such a situation would always
be taxed as a purchase and liquidation, rather than as a reorganization,
regardless of how long the transferor corporation had held the cash and
treasury notes, and regardless of whether or not investing in cash equiva-
lents had become T's historic business. In example (4), on the other hand,
because of the existence of non-cash-equivalent third-party notes, the sit-
uation is distinguishable from a purchase and liquidation, on its face at
least. Therefore, analysis as a potential reorganization is in order. Under
this analysis we look for continuity of business enterprise and, since it is
lacking, the regulation concludes that even without cash equivalents such
a transaction fails to qualify as a tax-free reorganization. 148
142. See generally note 132 supra.
143. T.D. 7745,1981- 81.R.B. 9, at9.
144. 1963-1 C.B. 77.
145. T.D. 7745, 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at 9.
146. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
147. T.D. 7745, 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at9.
148. This analysis indicates that the IRS would never accept the merger of a personal holding
company consisting entirely of cash equivalents into an investment company, and would be ex-
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Further enlightenment comes from comparing Revenue Ruling 63-29
both to example (4) and to a subsequent IRS pronouncement in Revenue
Ruling 81-25.149 The only factual difference between Revenue Ruling
63-29150 and example (4) is that in the Revenue Ruling the corporation
that disposed of its business assets survived the merger (technically, a
"C" reorganization), whereas in example (4) the corporation continuing
its own business survived the merger. In Revenue Ruling 63-29 the IRS
originally held the enterprise continuity requirement to be satisfied so
long as the surviving corporation conducted any business. In example (4)
this conclusion is narrowed because, although the surviving corporation
continues to conduct its own business, it does not continue to conduct the
business of the transferor. It thus seems that a distinction is being made
based upon which corporation survives the merger, the insubstantial tech-
nicality that so offended the court151 in the Morris Trust case.
The IRS has agreed. 152 It quite frankly states that the continuity of
business enterprise requirement does not apply to the business or to the
business assets of the transferee corporation prior to the reorganization. 153
Consequently, if the target corporation is the survivor of the reorganiza-
tion, then the parties can make whatever changes they would like, both to
the businesses and the assets of the target corporation, without violating
the new continuity of business enterprise regulation. Thus, in an attempt
to define more precisely the substance of a valid reorganization, the IRS
has created another formal distinction in this area. Enlightened practition-
ers will avoid continuity of enterprise issues entirely whenever it is possi-
ble to structure the reorganization in a manner that confines the pre- or
post-reorganization manipulation of assets or businesses to the surviving
corporation. Enterprise continuity, then, becomes in many cases merely a
trap for the unwary, rather than an all pervasive substantive requirement
for a valid reorganization.
B. Lack of Overall Plan Requirement
One last observation about example (4) is in order. Both examples (3)
and (5) were amended in the final form to specifically identify the disqual-
ifying business and assets disposals as being part of the overall plan of
tremely reluctant to approve such a merger when the personal holding company held third-party notes
unless they were extremely old and cold. Neither proposition has yet been tested in the courts.
149. 1981-4I.R.B. 11.
150. 1963-1 C.B. 77.
151. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
152. Rev. Rul. 81-25, 1981-4I.R.B. 11.
153. Id. at 11.
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reorganization. 154 Example (4), in both its proposed and final form, does
not make such a qualification. Consequently, while not explicitly stated
anywhere, one cannot help but expect that the government may view such
disposals by the target corporation close in time to the reorganization
transaction as disqualifying the reorganization regardless of intention of
the parties. This appears to be the position taken by the IRS in Revenue
Ruling 79-434, that the economic substance of the transaction is so obvi-
ous that purchase and liquidation treatment is in order regardless of the
format of the transaction and intention of the parties.155 Apparently the
government's view is the same, not only on account of cash equivalence,
but also on account of proximity in time to the reorganization transaction.
Since time-including planned delays-heals many wounds, again ex-
ample (4) appears to present another trap for the unwary. Pre-reorganiza-
tion planning should now insure that major asset and line-of-business dis-
posals by the target corporation be allowed to grow old and cold prior to
the reorganization if the acquiring corporation is to be the survivor; or
alternatively the reorganization should be structured to leave the target
corporation as the survivor.
X. OTHER QUESTIONS
A. Effect of Compliance with Statutory Requirements
Does compliance with the statutory requirements of section 368 for ac-
quisitive reorganizations automatically insure compliance with the new
enterprise continuity regulation? Surely this is not the case in "A" and
"B'" reorganizations. 156 Compliance wih state merger laws is no guaran-
tee that any line of business will be continued or that substantially all of
the assets of the transferor will be retained by the acquiror. The stock-for-
voting-stock requirements of a "B" reorganization create little, if any,
pre- or post-transaction limitations on manipulations of assets and busi-
ness. 157 The "substantially all" property requirement of section
368(a)(1)(C) might force most "C"' 158 reorganizations into a form of
compliance analogous to example (2) of the new regulation. Not all
154. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 76,813, 76,815 (1979) (proposed regulation) with Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1 (d)(5) (1980).
155. See notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
156. A statutory merger of a subsidiary, for example, is taxed as a liquidation rather than an
"A'" reorganization. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(d) (1955): B. BiTrKER & J. EUSTICE. supra note 115, at
14-140. See generally text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
157. See also Rev. Rul. 81-92, 1981-12 I.R.B. 6.
158. See generally note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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"D" 1 59 reorganizations will automatically qualify. As previously men-
tioned, a vertical split of an integrated business will satisfy the statutory
requirements of sections 368 and 355 without necessarily constituting
continuation of a historical line of business for enterprise-continuity pur-
poses. 160 Thus, enterprise-continuity compliance is a new factor that reor-
ganization planners must consider, independent of steps taken to comply
with the statutory requirements of most acquisitive reorganizations.
B. Applicability to All Types of Organizations
It is obvious from the examples that the new regulation applies to asset-
transfer reorganizations such as types "A," "C," and "D."' 161 The
Treasury Department points out that the final regulations have been
amended to clarify that they do in fact also apply to "B" reorganiza-
tions. 162 But what about nonacquisitive reorganizations such as "E" and
"F" reorganizations? Technically speaking, a corporation which changes
its line of business and soon thereafter changes its state of incorporation
would violate the continuity of business enterprise regulation. Yet there
does not seem to be any policy reason for denying tax-free status to such a
transfer. Prudence, however, would suggest obtaining a letter ruling on
this point prior to the transaction.
The "substantially all" requirement of section 354(b) has been made
expressly applicable to the new type "G" reorganization for corporations
in bankruptcy proceedings. 163 It is difficult to see how this requirement
can be satisfied when large amounts of corporate assets are used to satisfy
creditor claims, rather than transferred to the surviving corporation.
One hopes any liberalization of the requirements under section 354(b)
will also apply to the enterprise continuity regulation.
C. Minimizing Risks Through Warranties
While some relatively predictable, answers exist, we still are faced with
the problem of how to avoid, or at least to minimize, the risks and uncer-
tainties in this area. As previously mentioned, we can avoid the whole
problem by having the business- or asset-disposing corporation, T, sur-
159. See generally note 14 and accompanying text supra.
160. See part V.A.1. supra.
161. Examples (2), (4), and (5) are mergers and hence "A" reorganizations. Examples (1) and
(3) involve asset transfers and hence can be either "C" or "D" reorganizations, depending on the
amount of voting stock received in the exchange.
162. T.D. 7745, 1981-8 I.R.B. 9, at 13.
163. I.R.C. § 354(b)(1).
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vive the reorganization. This, however, is not always possible, for innu-
merable reasons beyond tax considerations.
Another way to minimize risks, or at least to divide them more equit-
ably, is through warranties between the parties to the reorganization. The
target corporation would most likely not be making any warranties re-
garding enterprise continuity because of the vagaries of present law, and
because the facts that might control such determinations can usually be
readily ascertained by the acquiring corporation. The target corporation,
and most likely its shareholders, would be much more interested in re-
ceiving warranties from the acquiring corporation as to its future plans for
the target corporation's business and assets. The acquiring corporation
would most likely be extremely reluctant to offer an absolute indemnity
for taxes arising on account of failure to meet enterprise continuity, and
would also most likely be extremely reluctant to commit itself to an in-
flexible retention of assets and business for an indefinite or stated period
of time.
The target corporation and its shareholders would most likely demand,
and the acquiring corporation would most likely give, a representation
that neither party contemplated the subsequent disposal of the business or
the assets by the acquiring corporation as part of the overall plan of the
transaction. Such warranty and representations, while not guaranteeing
any safety, would at least offer some starting point in a defense against an
allegation that the continuity of business enterprise regulations were not
complied with.
XI. CONCLUSION
Some, but not all, older-form continuity of enterprise answers are ap-
propriate in dealing with reorganization-enterprise continuity. In identify-
ing lines of business for purposes of the regulation, it seems likely that the
vertical division of a single integrated business will not produce a sepa-
rate line of business, so guidance from the section 355 area is limited to
the old regulations and the pre-Coady decisions. Geographical location is
a factor, but not itself conclusive, in identifying a separate line of busi-
ness. It is not clear whether the maintenance of pre-reorganization sepa-
rate customers is a prerequisite for existence of a separate line of busi-
ness.
Asset continuity appears to be governed by the law developed under
section 354(b)(1)(A), thus offering more certainty in this area. Opera-
tional quality, rather than economic quantity, determines what constitutes
a significant portion of assets. The measure is based on all assets of the
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transferor rather than just on the assets of one line of business. The acqui-
ror's use of the assets, however, can be quite passive.
The historicity of a line of business must be established prior to the
formulation of the reorganization plan. While passive investment activity
can theoretically constitute a historic line of business, three years of pre-
reorganization conduct appears to be a minimum requirement. Post-reor-
ganization revival of a dormant business line has received more sympathy
from the courts than from the IRS, with the pre-reorganization motive for
business cessation being the controlling factor on the effectiveness of
post-reorganization revival.
Post-reorganization business changes contemplated by the reorganiza-
tion plan appear theoretically possible, although vagaries abound. Conti-
nuity of employees and of a location within the same business area appear
to be the most important considerations, with identity of product line and
customers holding somewhat less importance. Identity of assets seems
least important, except when no line of business is being continued.
Although some guidance is available from the older forms, the new
reorganization-enterprise continuity regulation raises more questions than
it answers. Despite this uncertainty, at least two areas of safety are avail-
able for prudent practitioners. Whenever possible, the parties can avoid
the whole problem by having the target corporation survive the reorgani-
zation. Whenever this is not possible, the parties ought to exchange war-
ranties that show a good-faith attempt to comply with the new regulation,
and equitably divide any remaining tax risks.
